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I. Introduction
In an historic event, on July 17, 1998, 120 nations adopted and opened for
signature the Statute Creating an International Criminal Court at the
United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court held in Rome, Italy.' Most commentators believe
that a permanent International Criminal Court is necessary to ensure that
acts of mass murder, rape, and torture are not committed with impunity,
and individuals responsible for such heinous acts and serious violations of
international humanitarian law are brought to justice and severely pun-
ished for their crimes. In support of a permanent International Criminal
Court, one commentator has noted:
Armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights and humanitarian
law continue to victimize millions of people throughout the world. As a
result, more than 86 million civilians have died, been disabled or been
stripped of their rights, property and dignity since the end of World War II.
The world community has done very little for them or their families. Most
victims have been forgotten and few perpetrators have been brought to jus-
tice. A culture of impunity seems to have prevailed. 2
At the same time, the creation of a permanent International Criminal
Court is not a new or novel idea. The international community has studied
the possibility of establishing such a court for at least fifty years. 3 In 1948,
the United Nations General Assembly invited the International Law Com-
mission (ILC) to study the matter with respect to the prosecution of per-
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Treaty
has since been signed by 139 States, and ratified by 48, including: Argentina, Austria,
Belgium, Belize, Botswana, Canada, Croatia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany,
Ghana, Iceland, Italy, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mali, Marshall Islands, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Rome Statute Ratification Statute, at
http://www.igc.apc.org/icc/rome/html/ratify.html (last visited January 11, 2002) [here-
inafter Ratification Status]. The Statute shall enter into force after ratification by sixty
nations. Rome Statute, supra, art. 126(1).
2. Roy S. Lee, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF
THE ROME STATUTE I (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE].
3. The creation of a permanent international criminal court was envisioned by the
State Parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948) [hereinafter Crime and Punishment Convention]. This
Convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 9, 1948 and
entered into force on January 12, 1951. Id. In 2001, there were 132 State Parties to the
Genocide Convention. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, U.N. Treaty Collection, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/
treatylgen.htm. Article VI provides:
Persons charged with genocide or any other acts enumerated in article III shall
be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall accepted its jurisdiction.
(emphasis added).
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sons charged with genocide. 4 The ILC concluded that the establishment of
such a court was both desirable and possible. As a result, in 1950 the
General Assembly set up a Committee on International Criminal Jurisdic-
tion consisting of representatives of seventeen member states to prepare a
concrete draft on the establishment of a permanent international court.5
The Committee submitted a draft statute in 1951, which it subsequently
amended in 1953. However, the General Assembly permanently shelved
the 1953 Draft Statute primarily due to the absence of an internationally
accepted definition of the crime of aggression. 6
With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the United Nations
returned in earnest to the project of creating a permanent International
Criminal Court. In 1989, a coalition of sixteen Caribbean and Latin Amer-
ican nations, perceiving the court as an effective way of dealing with the
difficulties encountered in prosecuting and extraditing narco-terrorists,
reintroduced the issue in the agenda of the General Assembly.7 In 1990, as
requested, the ILC submitted an interim report to the General Assembly on
the issue of establishing an International Criminal court.8 The General
Assembly responded by asking the ILC to further consider the issues raised
in their 1992 report and to make concrete proposals for resolving them.
The ILC formed a Working Group to address questions regarding the scope
of the international criminal jurisdiction of the proposed court. Among
other things, the Working Group recommended that the court should be a
"flexible and supplementary facility" for State Parties to the statute and
that it should not have exclusive jurisdiction. 9 On the basis of the Working
Group's proposals, on November 25, 1992, the General Assembly adopted
a resolution calling on the ILC to formally draft a statute for an Interna-
Id. art. VI.
4. The International Law Commission was established by the General Assembly in
1947 pursuant to its obligation to encourage the codification and progressive develop-
ment of international law as required by Article 13(1) of the United Nations Charter.
The ILC consists of 34 members who are persons of recognized competence in interna-
tional law, who are elected by the General Assembly.
5. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to the Report of the
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction), 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 11, at 21,
U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952) [hereinafter Draft Statute].
6. Report of the ILC, 42d Sess., May 1 -July 28, 1990, 45 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10,
at 41-42, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 (1990).
7. International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities Engaged in Illicit
Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs Across National Frontiers and Other Transnational Criminal
Activities: Establishment of an International Criminal Court with Jurisdiction over Such
Crimes, U.N. G.A. Res. 44/39, 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(1989), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44rO39.htm.
8. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Second
Session (1990): Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee, paras. 119-
156, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.456 (1991).
9. Report of the Working Group on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,
in Report of the ILC, 44th Sess. May 4-July 24, 1992, 47 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 10, annex, at
162, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992).
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tional Criminal Court "as a matter of priority."10
Additionally, the Security Council's steps to address the war crimes
and other atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has-
tened the efforts of the General Assembly to create a permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Moreover, the Security Council's establishment of
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda ad hoc tribunals in May 1993 removed any
question as to the political and legal feasibility of creating an International
Criminal Court. Finally, at the United Nation's forty-fifth session, in 1993,
the ILC reconvened its Working Group on an International Criminal Court,
and completed a preliminary draft statute for a permanent court, relying
heavily on the newly established Yugoslavia Tribunal." The Statute of the
International Criminal Court was thereafter adopted, in 1998, at the Rome
conference. ' 2
The United States signed the treaty establishing a permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court.13 However, strong objections remain and the pros-
pects for ratification by the United States Senate appear dim.14 While the
United States generally supports the creation of a permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC or Court), it opposes such a court as set forth in the
1998 Rome Statute because it leaves open the potential for United States
military personnel and government officials to be hailed before the ICC in
situations such as the following:
A State not a party to the treaty launched a campaign of terror against a
dissident minority inside its territory. Thousands of innocent civilians were
killed. International peace and security were imperiled. The United States
participated in a coalition to use military force to intervene and stop the
killing. Unfortunately, in so doing, bombs intended for military targets
10. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fourth Ses-
sion, G.A Res. 47/33 (Nov. 25, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/47/584, available at http://www.un.
org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r033.htm.
I1. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth Ses-
sion, 48 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, at 258, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993).
12. For a comprehensive discussion of significant events leading to the adoption of
the Statute Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court at the Rome Conference,
see THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, at 1-39.
13. The White House Office of Communications, Statement by the President, 2001
WL 6008 (Jan. 2, 2001).
14. Initially, the United States, along with Algeria, China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and
Yemen voted against the Rome Treaty. However, on December 31, 2000, the last day the
Rome Statute remained open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New
York, the United States and Israel became signatories to the Statute. Ratification Status,
supra note 1. Additionally, on December 28, 2000, Algeria and Yemen signed the Rome
Statute. Id. China, Iraq, and Libya have yet to sign. However, legislation has been intro-
duced into Congress which would prohibit the United States Government or a State or
local government, including any court, from cooperating with the ICC relating to arrest,
extradition and transit of suspects, seizure of property, asset forfeiture, execution of
searches and seizures, service of warrants and other judicial process, and taking of evi-
dence. See American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4654, 106th Cong.,
(2d Sess. 2000) (sponsored by Congressman Delay, Armey, Watts, Blunt, Fowler, Pryce,
Cox, Dreier, Spence, Gilman, Goss, Hyde, Stump, Smith, Barr, and Aderholt; the Senate
version of the bill is S 2726, sponsored by Senators Helms, Lott, Warner, Hatch, Grams,
and Shelby).
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went astray. A hospital was hit. An apartment building demolished. Some
civilians being used as human shields were mistakenly shot by United States
troops. The State responsible for the atrocities demanded that United States
officials and commanders should be prosecuted by the International Crimi-
nal Court. The demand was supported by a small group of other States.
Under the terms of the Rome treaty, in the absence of a Security Council
referral, the Court could not investigate those responsible for killing
thousands, yet the United States officials, commanders and soldiers could
face an international investigation and even prosecution. 15
Although the loss of innocent civilian life in such a situation would be
highly regrettable, and perhaps even condemnable, the United States main-
tains that the conduct would not rise to the level of a war crime or other
offence within the jurisdiction of the proposed ICC. 16 Thus, the United
States adamantly maintains that the ICC should not be permitted to exer-
cise its jurisdiction over such conduct.
The problem with the United States' position is that its argument
against the Rome Statute is outcome-based. In other words, the United
States opposes an ICC that could exercise jurisdiction over United States
soldiers, military commanders, and political leaders for the inadvertent,
unintended loss of innocent civilian life caused during an international
peace-keeping operation. That outcome is simply unacceptable to the
United States. However, what is the legal basis, if any, for the United States'
opposition to the Rome Statute? Stated another way, can the United States'
outcome-based argument be converted into a legal argument? If so, per-
haps the United States could more effectively persuade other State Parties
to embrace its view, and provide a further basis for addressing the United
States' concerns when the ICC's Draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence are
submitted for consideration at the first meeting of the Assembly of States
Parties. 17
15. U.N. GAOR, 53d Session, Agenda Items, 153: Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/53/SR.9 (1998); see also Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Signs
Treaty for World Court to Try Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at Al ("While adminis-
tration officials have strongly supported the creation of an international court, Mr. Clin-
ton had until today heeded warnings from the Pentagon that such a court would subject
American troops, diplomats and other officials to frivolous or politically motivated
prosecutions.").
16. At the very least, the conduct pales in comparison to the barbarous atrocities
committed against the Jewish people as part of Nazi Germany's "final solution" during
World War 1I, or the mass murders and systematic rapes perpetrated against innocent
civilians during armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
17. The United Nations Conference on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court has established a Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court tasked with preparing draft texts of Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Elements of
Crimes, and a relationship agreement between the Court and the United Nations. Final
Act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Court, Annex I, Res. F, U.N. Doc. A/conf. 183/10 (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/n9824185.pdf [hereinafter Final Act]. The Preparatory
Commission finalized and approved the Draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence on June
30, 2002. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC-Addendum Finalized Draft
Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000).
The Assembly of State Parties may "consider and adopt, as appropriate, recommenda-
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The United States' opposition to the Rome Statute could be construed
as an objection to the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction, which directly
implicates the principle of complementarity.18 In short, the complemen-
tarity regime established by the Statute does not adequately limit the ICC's
ability to intervene with respect to matters properly within a State's juris-
diction. Stated another way, the Court is not sufficiently deferential to
national criminal jurisdictions.
A fundamental question facing the drafters of the Rome Statute was
the role the ICC would play with respect to national courts. Several States,
while supporting the establishment of an ICC, were reluctant to create a
court with primary or peremptory jurisdiction, requiring a State to defer or
surrender jurisdiction to the ICC with respect to the commission of certain
serious international crimes. In their view, such action would infringe on
national sovereignty by limiting a State's ability to prosecute persons
located in their territory suspected of committing international crimes.
Furthermore, under existing customary international law and various
multi-lateral treaties, States are obligated to prosecute many of the crimes
included in the Court's jurisdiction. t 9 These obligations are deemed para-
mount and should not be pre-empted or challenged by the ICC, acting as a
"super" or "supreme" international criminal court.
Ultimately, the drafters of the Rome Statute decided that national
courts should have primary jurisdiction. 20 Under the Rome Statute, the
proper role of the ICC is to complement national court jurisdictions and
tions of the Preparatory Commission." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 112(2)(a). The
Preparatory Commission will "remain in existence until the conclusion of the first meet-
ing of the Assembly of State Parties." Final Act, supra, Res. F, para. 8. Perhaps the
United States' reasons for opposing the Rome Statute can be addressed at the first meet-
ing of the Assembly of State Parties.
18. The Preamble of the Rome Statute states that the ICC "shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions." Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 10; accord
id. art. 1.
19. E.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
39/46 (1984) (establishing universal jurisdiction over acts of state-sponsored torture
and requiring a State Party to the Convention to prosecute or extradite if the offender is
found within its territory); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR 34th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23 (1979)
(establishing universal jurisdiction over acts of hostage-taking and requiring a State
Party to the Convention to prosecute or extradite if the offender is found within its terri-
tory); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (1948) (imposing an affirmative duty on the territorial state to prosecute
persons responsible for the commission of acts of genocide).
20. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17. In this respect, the proposed ICC stands
in stark contrast from the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda which are vested with primary jurisdiction over national courts. Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess. 3217th mtg. art. 9(2) U.N. Doc S/Res/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159
(1993); see also The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICT for Former Yugoslavia (1995) (dis-
cussing the primacy of the jurisdiction of the Yugoslavia Tribunal); International Tribu-
nal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. 3453d mtg., art. 8(2) U.N. Doc. S/
Res/955 (1994) (establishing primary jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal over domes-
tic courts).
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"fill the gap" when States fail to comply with their obligations to prosecute
perpetrators of serious international crimes.2 ' Consequently, if a national
court with jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting an offence within the
ICC's jurisdiction, the ICC should defer to the State's jurisdiction. 22
The Statute uses the term "complementary" to describe the relation-
ship between the ICC and national courts. 23 One commentator has
described the complementary relationship between the ICC and national
criminal jurisdictions established by the Rome Statute as follows:
The complementarity regime is one of the cornerstones on which the future
International Criminal Court will be built. Throughout the negotiating pro-
cess, States made clear that the most effective and viable system to bring
perpetrators of serious crimes to justice was one which must be based on
national procedures complemented by an international court. Such a sys-
tem would reinforce the primary obligation of States to prevent and prose-
cute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes - obligations which
existed for all States under conventional and customary international law.
At the same time, the system would create a mechanism, through a perma-
nent international criminal court, to fill the gap where States could not or
failed to comply with those obligations.2 4
At the same time, the Statute recognizes two exceptions to the rule of
complementarity, authorizing ICC prosecution despite pending State pro-
ceedings. The ICC is not required to defer its jurisdiction if a State with
jurisdiction is either (1) "unwilling" or (2) "unable" to undertake its obliga-
tions to prosecute serious international crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC. 25 The complementarity regime established by the Statute autho-
Article 9(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia provides: "The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts. At
any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request national
courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal in accordance with the
present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal."
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra, art.
9(2).
21. John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE, supra note 2, at 73-74; see also Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 10
("Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.") (emphasis in original); id. art. 1
(stating that the ICC "shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions").
22. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(a) (permitting the ICC to exercise its
jurisdiction when the State proceedings were undertaken with the purpose of "shield-
ing" the offender).
23. To underscore the importance of this principle with respect to the ICC's exercise
of jurisdiction, it is set forth in the Preamble, as well as art. 1 of the Rome Statute. See
Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 10 & art. 1. The International Law Commis-
sion placed the principle of complementarity in the preamble of the Draft Statute. The
third paragraph in the Preamble stated that the ICC was "intended to be complementary
to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be
available or may be ineffective." Draft Statute, supra note 5, pmbl.
24. Holmes, supra note 21, at 73-74.
25. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(a) (ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if
the State proceedings were or are being undertaken for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court).
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rizes the ICC to intervene when national criminal investigations or judicial
proceedings are or were a sham aimed at shielding perpetrators from crimi-
nal responsibility, or when a State cannot carry out its proceedings due to
a "total or substantial collapse of its national judicial system." 26
With respect to a State's unwillingness to prosecute, application of the
principle of complementarity to State proceedings conducted in bad faith
presents the easy case. If a State, acting in bad faith, refuses to prosecute,
the ICC should exercise its jurisdiction to ensure that persons do not com-
mit serious international crimes with impunity. A more difficult question,
however, is to what extent the principle of complementarity requires the
ICC to defer to State judgments on questions of legal and factual suffi-
ciency, resulting in a decision not to prosecute. For example, under the
complementarity regime established by the Rome Statute, could the ICC
properly exercise its jurisdiction over United States nationals if, after con-
ducting a full investigation of the situation, United States prosecutors con-
cluded that the alleged misconduct did not constitute an offence under the
Statute, and therefore decided not to prosecute the persons concerned? In
such a case, could the ICC intervene in the matter anyway if it believed that
the United States misapplied or interpreted the law in a manner inconsis-
tent with the aim of bringing the persons concerned to justice? 27
The dilemma is whether the ICC should be permitted to intervene
only when the evidence demonstrates that the State proceedings were not
conducted independently or impartially (sham proceedings intended to
shield the perpetrator), or whether the ICC should exercise jurisdiction to
correct a perceived miscarriage of justice for any reason. In the latter situa-
tion, exercise of ICC jurisdiction turns on whether the ICC may substitute
its judgment for that of State prosecutors on questions of legal and factual
sufficiency or other matters involving the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
26. See id. art. 17(3); see also id. art. 17(2).
27. Under the United States' criminal justice system, the prosecutor is afforded wide
discretion regarding whether to file criminal charges. Absent a finding that the decision
to prosecute was based on impermissible factors such, as race or religion, the courts are
not permitted to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. United States v. Arm-
strong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) ("In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor
has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present clear evidence to
the contrary."). Furthermore, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute
could be based on any number of legitimate factors, including, for example, questions
on the sufficiency of evidence, whether important probative evidence would likely be
excluded at trial, whether the government can prove that the defendant had the requisite
intent to support a criminal conviction, the application of a legal defense to the criminal
charges, and the presence of mitigating factors justifying the non-prosecution decision.
If a decision not to prosecute was based on any of the above-described reasons, a United
States court would not intervene and require prosecution. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offence defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prose-
cute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his
discretion."); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("Such factors as the
strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's
enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforce-
ment plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to
undertake.").
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tion. Stated differently, in the case of a good faith disagreement on ques-
tions of law or the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion, should a
State's decision not to prosecute be afforded deference by the ICC? If not,
then the ICC's role with respect to national criminal jurisdictions would be
more analogous to that of a "super" international appellate court, vested
with de novo review authority, rather than a court intended to complement
States with primary jurisdiction.2 8 If this is in fact the case, perhaps the
concerns voiced by the United States are warranted. At the very least, the
Rome Statute appears to have fallen short of realizing the objective of estab-
lishing a complementary relationship between the ICC and State
jurisdictions.
One possible solution to the dilemma would be to require the ICC to
apply a deferential standard of review when determining whether a State
was unwilling to prosecute because it determined that prosecution was
legally or factually unwarranted. For example, a "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard of review could be applied to questions of legal and factual suffi-
ciency. Finally, the ICC should defer to State proceedings if there exists a
reasonable basis for the State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to
prosecute. An objective standard to determine whether the ICC should
assert jurisdiction when a State decides not to prosecute clearly would
strengthen the complementarity regime.
In addition to concerns with respect to whether the jurisdiction of the
ICC is truly complementary, the United States' opposition to the Statute
also could be based on its fears that the definition of "war crimes" con-
tained in Article 8 of the Statute is so broad that it could be construed to
cover negligent acts resulting in death or serious bodily injury to innocent
civilians committed during a United Nations peace-keeping mission. 29
Finally, the United States' position might further stem from an objection to
the scope of criminal liability permitted under the doctrine of command
responsibility found in Article 28.30 Under Article 28, criminal liability
could attach to military commanders, as well as government officials for
failing to prevent the acts of military subordinates that caused civilian fatal-
28. See Holmes, supra note 21, at 49 ("Many delegations were sensitive to the poten-
tial for the Court to function as a kind of court of appeal, passing judgments on the
decisions and proceedings of national judicial systems.").
29. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8. The Rome Statute also includes genocide,
crimes against humanity and crimes against aggression within the Court's jurisdiction.
Id. art. 5. However, what constitutes a crime of aggression has yet to be defined under
the Statute. Id. art. 5(2). Genocide requires a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, which could not be proved under the
facts outlined in the United States hypothetical. See id. art. 6. Finally, crimes against
humanity would require proof of the "multiple commission" of acts referred to in para-
graph 1, which describes the conduct prohibited under the statute, against a civilian
population, committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a State policy to commit such
attack. See id. art. 7. Therefore, a single incident involving the inadvertent bombing of a
hospital would not suffice. Furthermore, the evidence in the United States hypothetical
fails to demonstrate that the bombing was committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State policy to engage in such bombings against the victimized nation.
30. See id. art. 28 (entitled "Responsibility of commanders and other superiors").
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ities.3 1 Furthermore, under Article 28, criminal liability may attach even if
the military commander or government official lacked actual knowledge,
but "should have known" that subordinates were committing or about to
commit such crimes.3
2
Part II of this Article discusses the complementarity regime estab-
lished by the Rome Statute. Part III examines whether the complementar-
ity principle would require the ICC to defer to a decision by the United
States not to prosecute persons responsible for alleged crimes committed
during a United Nations-sanctioned peace-keeping operation. Part IV anal-
yses whether the conduct set forth in the United States' hypothetical case
would constitute a "war crime" as defined in Article 8 of the Statute. Part V
examines the doctrine of command responsibility as codified by Article 28,
and the extent to which criminal liability might extend to military com-
manders and government officials. Finally, Part VI concludes that the ICC
as constituted in the Rome Statute in its current form does not sufficiently
respect national sovereignty and therefore should not be ratified by the
United States.
II. The Complementarity Regime
Paragraph 10 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and Article 1 of the Statute explicitly provide that the ICC
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. 33 To determine
whether the United States' concerns are warranted with respect to the
ICC's complementary status, we must examine the complex procedural
scheme that has been established under the Statute for triggering the juris-
diction of the ICC.
A. Referral of a Situation by a State Party, the U.N. Security Council,
or Initiation of an Investigation by the ICC Prosecutor Proprio
Motu
Pursuant to Article 13, a criminal investigation may be initiated with
31. Id.
32. Id. Additional concerns have been raised that United States nationals prose-
cuted before the ICC would not benefit from the same procedural protections as they
would under the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, including among other
things, the right to a trial by jury, the right not to be compelled to provide self-incrimi-
nating testimony, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. See The Ameri-
can Servicemembers Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4654, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000).
It is also maintained that fear of prosecution of United States servicemen operating
overseas could inhibit the ability of the United States to use its military to meet alliance
obligations and participate in multinational operations including humanitarian peace-
keeping operations. Id.
33. Paragraph 10 of the Preamble to the Rome Statute to the International Criminal
Court states that "the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions." Rome Statute, supra note 1,
pmbl., para. 10. Article 1 provides that the International Criminal Court "shall be com-
plementary to national criminal jurisdictions." See id. art. 1.
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respect to a crime referred to in Article 5 in one of three ways. 3 4 The "situ-
ation"3 5 in which one or more of the charged crimes appear to have been
committed may be (1) referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accor-
dance with Article 14;36 (2) referred to the Prosecutor by the United
Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter;37 or (3) an investigation may be initiated by the ICC Prosecutor
proprio motu.38
During the Conference debates preceding the adoption of the Rome
Statute, the Prosecutor's power to initiate an investigation proprio motu
proved controversial. The delegates advanced strong arguments both in
favor and against. Proponents offered two principal arguments in support
of an expanded role for the Prosecutor. First, authorizing the Prosecutor to
initiate criminal investigations would enhance his or her autonomy and
independence, as well as the independence and credibility of the Court as a
whole. Second, the Prosecutor of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was granted ex officio powers,
and, proponents maintained, there was no good reason to deny the same
power to the Prosecutor of the ICC. 39 However, several States feared abuse
of this power and believed that some limiting measures were needed to
ensure the Prosecutor's accountability. 40 Ultimately, the delegates decided
that the Statute should implement a system of checks and balances. Thus,
in the absence of a State Party or U.N. Security Council referral, the Statute
requires the Prosecutor to obtain the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber to
proceed with an investigation. 4 1
34. Article 5 vests the ICC with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and crimes of aggression. Id. art. 5.
35. At the early stages of the proceedings, the exact nature of the offence(s) or iden-
tify of the offenders may be unknown. Therefore, Article 13 uses the term "situation"
which was intended to be broader in scope than referring a criminal case or matter for
investigation by the ICC Prosecutor. Id. art. 13.
36. See id. art. 13(a). Article 14 further provides:
1. A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed
requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of deter-
mining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the com-
mission of such crimes.
2. As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circumstances and be
accompanied by such supporting documentation as is available to the State
referring the situation.
Id. art. 14.
37. Id. art. 13(b).
38. See id. art. 13(c). In deciding whether to proceed proprio motu, the Prosecutor
may consider evidence from States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or
non-governmental organizations, victims, or other reliable sources of information. Id.
art. 15(2).
39. Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, at 176-81.
40. Id. at 181.
41. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(4). The Rome Statute creates an Appeals
Division comprised of the President and four other judges, a Trial Division of not less
that six judges and a Pre-Trial Division of not less than six judges. Id. art. 39. Addition-
ally, the Appeals Chamber shall be composed of all the judges of the Appeals Division,
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Pursuant to Article 15(3), if after conducting a preliminary investiga-
tion, the Prosecutor concludes that there is a "reasonable basis to proceed
with an investigation," she is required to submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a
request for formal authorization of an investigation.4 2 At the same time, if
the Prosecutor concludes that the information provided does not constitute
a reasonable basis for an investigation, he or she shall inform those per-
sons who provided the information of the decision. 4 3 However, a decision
not to proceed with an investigation does not preclude the Prosecutor from
considering new information or evidence submitted to him or her regard-
ing the same situation. If the Pre-Trial Chamber agrees with the Prosecu-
tor's assessment that a "reasonable basis" exists to proceed with an
investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Court, a formal investigation shall be authorized. 44 If, on the other hand,
meaning a single panel of five judges. However, the Trial Division is divided into two
Trial Chambers of three judges each. Finally, the functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber are
carried out by three judges of the Pre-Trial Division or a single judge of that division in
accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Id. art. 39(2)(a),
(b). For example, orders or rulings of the Pre-Trial Chamber issued under Articles 15,
18, 19, 54, paragraph 2, 61 paragraph 7, and 72 must be decided by a three-judge panel.
Id. art. 57. In all other cases, a single judge of the Pre-Trial Chamber may decide the
matter, unless otherwise provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Id. Arti-
cle 36 outlines the qualifications and process for nomination and election of judges.
Article 36(3)(a) provides that the "judges shall be chosen from among persons of high
moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in
their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices." Id. art. 36(3)(a).
Additionally, every candidate for election to the Court shall:
(i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the neces-
sary relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other sim-
ilar capacity, in criminal proceedings; or
(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive
experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial
work of the Court.
Id. art. 36(3)(b)(i)(2).
Finally, "[elvery candidate for election to the Court shall have an excellent knowledge
of and be fluent in at least one of the working languages of the Court." Id. art. 36(3)(c).
Judicial candidates may be nominated by any State Party to the Statute. The judges
shall be elected by secret ballot at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties convened
for that purpose. The persons elected shall be the eighteen candidates who obtain the
highest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of the States Parties present and vot-
ing. Finally, no two judges may be nationals of the same State, and the States Parties, in
the selection of judges shall take into account representation of the principal legal sys-
tems of the world, equitable geographical representation, and a fair representation of
female and male judges. Id. art. 36.
42. Id. art. 15(3). Article 15(3) provides:
If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for
authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material col-
lected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accor-
dance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
id.
43. Id. art. 15(6).
44. Id. art. 15(4). It is interesting to note that Article 15(3) does not require the Pre-
Trial Chamber to find that there is a "reasonable basis" to believe that a particular per-
son has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Instead, the Statute
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the Pre-Trial Chamber denies the Prosecutor's request, the denial is with-
out prejudice. The Prosecutor may resubmit a request based on new facts
or evidence regarding the same situation.4
5
B. Acceptance of Jurisdiction (Article 12)
If a State Party refers a situation to the Prosecutor or if the Prosecutor initi-
ates the investigation proprio motu, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction
only if the territorial State - the State where the crime was committed - or
the nationality State of the nationality of the accused, has consented to the
jurisdiction of the Court. However, the referral of a situation by the U.N.
Security Council acting under its Chapter VII authority does not require
the consent of either the territorial or nationality State.
4 6
Acceptance of jurisdiction is governed by Article 12, which states in
relevant part:
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the juris-
diction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.
2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute
or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph
3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred
or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of
registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is
required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the
Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the
crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court with-
out any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.47
Article 12(1) confers automatic jurisdiction, permitting the Court to
exercise its jurisdiction if either the territorial State or the State of national-
ity of the accused is a Party to the Statute. 48 However, if neither is a Party
to the Rome Statute, and the case is referred to the Prosecutor by a State
Party, or the investigation has been initiated by the Prosecutor proprio
motu, the territorial State or the State of nationality must consent to the
jurisdiction of the ICC. 4 9 Thus, if both the State where the alleged crimi-
nal acts occurred, and the State where the accused is a national object to
the Court's jurisdiction, the ICC is denied jurisdiction over the complaint.
merely requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to find that there is a reasonable basis "to proceed
with an investigation," and the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Thus, the standard for authorizing the continuation of the investigation and, apparently,
the filing of criminal charges is quite low. Id. art. 15(3).
45. Id. art. 15(5).
46. Under Article 12(2), acceptance by a non-State Party of the exercise of the ICC's
jurisdiction is only required when the referral is made by a State Party or when the
Prosecutor has initiated the investigation. Id. art. 12(2).
47. Id. art. 12.
48. Id. arts. 12(1), 12(2)(b).
49. Id. art. 12(3).
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Acceptance of the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction may be demonstrated
by a declaration lodged with the Registrar.50
C. Issues of Admissibility (Article 17)
Central to the principle of complementarity is the concept of "inadmissibil-
ity" embodied in Article 17 of the Rome Statute.5 ' Article 17 provides that
a case is "inadmissible," meaning the Court is barred from considering it,
if any of four circumstances exist: (1) the case is being investigated or pros-
ecuted by a State that has jurisdiction over it; (2) the case has been investi-
gated by a State that has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not
to prosecute the persons concerned; (3) the person concerned has already
been tried for conduct that is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by
the ICC is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3 (ne bis in idem
principle); or (4) the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further
action by the Court.5 2
However, with respect to the first three reasons for finding a case inad-
missible, Article 17 recognizes an exception to the rule if a State with juris-
diction is "unwilling or unable" to carry out an investigation or
prosecution. 53 The Statute does not require deferral to State jurisdiction
when the decision not to prosecute resulted from (1) the "unwillingness or
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute," 54 or (2) in the case of a per-
son who has already been prosecuted, the State proceedings were for the
purpose of "shielding" the person concerned from criminal responsibility,
or (3) otherwise were not conducted independently and impartially. 55
Under the Statute, the words "unwilling" and "unable" carry special
meaning. With respect to whether the State is "unwilling" "genuinely" to
carry out the investigation or prosecution, or the decision not to prosecute
resulted from the "unwillingness" of the State "genuinely" to prosecute,
Article 17(2) provides:
50. id.
51. Id. art. 17(1).
52. Article 17 states in relevant part:
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall
determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has juris-
diction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely
to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under
article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court.
Id. art. 17.
53. Id. art. 17(1)(a).
54. Id. art. 17(1)(b).
55. Id. arts. 17(1)(c), 20.
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2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall
consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by inter-
national law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national deci-
sion was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person con-
cerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently
or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which,
in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice.5 6
Thus, under Article 17(2), the term "unwilling" has three related
meanings. First, under subparagraph (a), a State may be found unwilling
to carry out a pending investigation or prosecution when the State proceed-
ings were undertaken or are being undertaken, or the decision not to pros-
ecute was made for the purpose of "shielding" the suspect from criminal
responsibility. 57 In such a case, the ICC is not required to defer. Second,
pursuant to subparagraph (b), the ICC is not required to defer if a State is
unwilling to undertake its obligations to investigate or prosecute a particu-
lar case if there has been an "unjustified delay" in the State proceedings,
which under the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the
suspect to justice. 58 Finally, pursuant to subparagraph (c), the ICC is not
required to defer if the State proceedings were not or are not being con-
ducted "independently or impartially," and were or are being conducted in
a manner inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice. 59
The reasons advanced under Article 17(2) for finding that a State is
"unwilling" to investigate or prosecute, i.e., "shielding," "unjustified delay,"
and lack of "independent or impartial" proceedings, are not mutually
exclusive. For example, evidence that there has been an unjustified delay
in the State proceedings could be relevant to prove that the proceedings
were for the purpose of "shielding" the offender from justice, as well as
demonstrate that the proceedings were not being conducted "indepen-
dently or impartially."
It should be emphasized that to determine "unwillingness" in a partic-
ular case, the ICC must apply "principles of due process recognized by
international law."60 Thus, whether the State attempted to "shield" the
offender, the proceedings were "unjustifiably delayed," or the proceedings
were not conducted "independently or impartially" should be measured
56. Id. art. 17(2).
57. Id. art. 17(2)(a).
58. Id. art. 17(2)(b).
59. Id. art. 17(2)(c).
60. Id. art. 17(2).
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against "principles of due process recognized by international law." 6 1
With respect to a State's inability to prosecute or carry out an investi-
gation, the Court shall consider whether "due to a total or substantial col-
lapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise
unable to carry out its proceedings. 6
2
D. Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility (Article 18)
When the Prosecutor has determined that there is a "reasonable basis" to
commence an investigation based upon a State Party referral, or has initi-
ated an investigation proprio motu pursuant to Articles 13(c) and 15, Arti-
cle 18 requires the Prosecutor to provide notice of the pending
investigation to all State Parties and those non-Party States that would nor-
mally have jurisdiction over the crimes concerned. 63 Upon receipt of such
notice, a State may file a motion in the Pre-Trial Chamber requesting that
the Prosecutor defer to the State's investigation or prosecution. Article
18(2) provides that within one month of receipt of notice from the Prosecu-
tor, a State may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated
its nationals or other persons within its jurisdiction with respect to crimi-
nal acts within the Court's jurisdiction, and request that the Prosecutor
defer to the State's investigation. 6 4 However, under the Statute, the ICC is
not required to defer to the State's investigation or criminal proceedings,
but may defer subject to its discretion.6 5 Pursuant to Article 18(2), the
Prosecutor either may defer to the State's investigation or petition the Pre-
Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation.66
If the ICC Prosecutor petitions the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize a
continuation of the investigation under Article 18, the Pre-Trial Chamber
may authorize the action with a majority ruling. Article 57(2)(a) states
that a simple majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber judges must concur in rul-
61. Id. This language was added to paragraph 2 of Article 17 in response to con-
cerns raised by some delegations that the article gave the Court unduly broad discretion
to determine unwillingness and no objective criteria on which the Court should base its
ruling. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, Committee of the Whole, 42d Meeting, A/
CONF.183/C.1/L.76, add. 1-14 (July 17, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icc/
journal/717joue.htm. However, whether this provides sufficient objective criterion for
determining a State's unwillingness to conduct fair and impartial proceedings remains
highly questionable. In fact, the meaning to be given the language "principles of due
process recognized by international law" is uncertain at best.
62. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(3).
63. Id. art. 18(1). Article 18 further provides that the Prosecutor may notify such
States on a confidential basis and, where necessary to protect persons, prevent destruc-
tion of evidence or prevent flight of suspects and potential witnesses, may limit the
scope of the information provided to the States. Id.
64. Id. art. 18(2).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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ings issued under Articles 15, 18, and 19.67 Thus, an application by the
Prosecutor to authorize the investigation, despite a request for deferral to
the State proceedings, may be granted based on an affirmative vote of two
judges of a three judge panel of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Furthermore,
either party, the State concerned, or the Prosecutor, may appeal to the
Appeals Chamber an adverse ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber with respect
to deferral of proceedings. 68
If the Prosecutor defers to a State's investigation, the matter may be
reviewed "by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral, or at any
time when there has been a significant change of circumstances" that
implicate the State's "unwillingness or inability to carry out the investiga-
tion or prosecution. '69 Additionally, when the Prosecutor has deferred an
investigation, she may request that the State periodically update the Prose-
cutor on the progress of its investigation. 70 Furthermore, under the Stat-
ute, State Parties shall respond to such requests "without undue delay."7 '
Finally:
[plending a ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber, or at any time when the Prose-
cutor has deferred an investigation under [Article 18], the Prosecutor may
... seek authority from the Pre-Trial Chamber to pursue necessary investiga-
tive steps for the purpose of preserving evidence where there is a unique
opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a significant risk that
evidence may not be subsequently available.
7 2
Thus, a decision to defer to a State's investigation does not necessarily ter-
minate or suspend the Prosecutor's investigation. The Prosecutor may seek
authority from the Pre-Trial Chamber to pursue investigatory steps to
obtain and preserve important evidence. 73
E. Challenges to the Admissibility of a Case (Article 19)
Under Article 19, the Court may, on its own motion, determine the admis-
sibility of a case in accordance with Article 17. 7 4 Under Article 19(2),
challenges to admissibility may be brought by: (1) "[ain accused or a per-
son for whom a warrant of arrest or summons to appear has been issued
67. Id. art. 57(2)(a). Additionally, Pre-Trial Chamber rulings under Article 54, para-
graph 2, and Article 61, paragraph 7, and Article 72 must be concurred in by a simple
majority ofjudges. Id. arts. 54, 61, 72.
68. Id. art. 18(4). If the Prosecutor defers to the State's investigation, the Prosecutor
may review the investigation six months after the date of deferral or at any time when
there is a significant change of circumstances suggesting that the State is not conducting
its investigation in good faith. Additionally, the Prosecutor may request that the State
concerned periodically inform the Prosecutor of the progress of its investigation and any
subsequent prosecutions. Id. art. 18(5). Under Article 18(5), the concerned State is
required to respond to such requests without undue delay. Id.
69. Id. art. 18(3).
70. Id. art. 18(5).
71. Id.
72. Id. art. 18(6).
73. Id.
74. Id. art. 19(1). Pursuant to Article 19(1), the Court shall also satisfy itself that it
has jurisdiction over any case brought before it. Id.
Cornell International Law Journal
under Article 58;" (2) "a State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the
ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or
prosecuted;" and (3) "[a] State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is
required under article 12" (the territorial or nationality State). 75 Addition-
ally, pursuant to Article 19(3), "the Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the
Court regarding a question of jurisdiction or admissibility. ' 76 Thus, in a
given case, the accused, the State investigating or prosecuting the matter,
the territorial State, as well as the ICC Prosecutor may be parties to a
motion on admissibility.
As a general rule, the admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction of the
Court may be challenged only once. 77 However, a State that has chal-
lenged a ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 18 may challenge
the admissibility of a case under Article 19 on the grounds of "additional
significant facts or significant change of circumstances. '7  Additionally,
even in the absence of a challenge filed under Article 18, the Court may
grant leave for a challenge to be brought more than once under exceptional
circumstances. 79
The challenge to the admissibility of a case shall take place prior to or
at the commencement of trial.8 0 Challenges at the commencement of trial,
or subsequently with the leave of the Court, may be based only on Article
17(1)(c), on grounds that the person concerned has already been prose-
cuted in State judicial proceedings, and prosecution by the ICC would vio-
late the principle of ne bis in idem.8 ' If the challenge takes place prior to
the confirmation of criminal charges, the challenges to admissibility shall
be filed with the Pre-Trial Chamber.8 2 If, on the other hand, the challenge
to admissibility is made after confirmation of charges, the challenges shall
be referred to the Trial Chamber.8 3 Furthermore, if a challenge is made by
a State, the Prosecutor is required to suspend the investigation until such
time as the Court makes a determination in accordance with Article 17.84
However, once again, the Court's decision to defer to the State's investiga-
tion or prosecution is discretionary. Decisions with respect to admissibil-
ity may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber.8 5 Finally, if the Court
75. Id. art. 19(2).
76. Id. art. 19(3). On questions of jurisdiction or admissibility, those who have
referred a situation under Article 13, as well as victims may submit observations to the
Court. Id.
77. Id. art. 19(4).
78. Id. art. 18(7).
79. Id. art. 19(4).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. art. 19(6).
83. id.
84. Id. art. 19(7). However, pending a ruling by the Court, the Prosecutor may seek
authority from the Court to: pursue necessary steps for the purpose of preserving evi-
dence where there is a unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a
substantial risk of loss of evidence; take a statement or testimony from a witness; and to
prevent the absconding of persons with respect to whom the Prosecutor has already
requested a warrant of arrest under Article 58. Id. art. 19(8).
85. Id. art. 19(6).
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decides that a case is inadmissible under Article 17, the Prosecutor may
submit a request for a review of the decision based upon new facts and
evidence, "which negate the basis on which the case had previously been
found inadmissible.
8 6
III. Application of the Complementarity Principle to a Decision by
the United States Not to Prosecute Persons for Alleged War
Crimes Committed During a U.N. Peace-Keeping
Operation
Under the Rome Statute, a decision to investigate and prosecute United
States nationals for the inadvertent bombing and killing of innocent civil-
ians during an international peace-keeping mission involves a four-step
process: (1) a referral of the situation for investigation to the ICC Prosecu-
tor either by a State Party or the United Nations Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,8 7 or initiation of an
investigation by the Prosecutor proprio motu;8 8 (2) acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction by the State where the alleged criminal acts were com-
mitted (the territorial State) or the State of nationality of the accused (the
nationality State);8 9 (3) a judicial finding that the Court has jurisdiction;90
and (4) a ruling that the case is admissible under Article 17.91
The first three steps in the process do not pose serious obstacles to an
ICC investigation and the filing of criminal charges against United States
nationals. First, while the United States' status and influence as a perma-
nent member of the U.N. Security Council would make it highly unlikely
that the situation would be referred to the Prosecutor by the U.N. Security
Council, any State Party that believes that the facts constitute an offence
within the Court's jurisdiction could refer the situation to the Prosecutor
for investigation. The quantum of proof required under the Statute for a
State Party referral is unclear. The only reference made to the subject is
found in Article 13(a), which merely provides that a State Party may refer a
situation to the Prosecutor when one or more of the crimes referred to in
Article 5 "appears to have been committed." 92 The Article 13(a) standard
86. Id. art. 19(10). If the Prosecutor defers an investigation, he or she may request
that the relevant State apprise the Prosecutor of progress made in the State proceedings.
Id. art. 19(11).
87. Under the United Nations Charter, decisions of the Security Council on procedu-
ral matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine members. U.N. CHARTER art. 27,
para. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters are made by an affirma-
tive vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. Additionally, Chapter VII only applies if the Security
Council determines that there is "a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression." U.N. CHARTER art. 39,
88. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13.
89. Id. art. 12.
90. Id. art. 19(1).
91. Id.
92. Id. art. 13(a). Article 14(2) further provides that "als far as possible, a referral
shall specify the relevant circumstances and be accompanied by such supporting docu-
mentation as is available to the State referring the situation." Id. art. 14(2).
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does not even require that the referral be based on credible evidence or a
reasonable basis to believe an offence within the Court's jurisdiction has
been committed. Thus, under Article 13(a), a State Party referral could be
made based on hearsay, multiple hearsay, little or no evidence, as well as
purely political reasons.
Upon receipt of a State Party referral, the Statute affords the Prosecu-
tor wide discretion to decide whether to proceed with a formal investiga-
tion.93 Pursuant to Article 18(1), the Prosecutor may commence an
investigation if she has determined that a "reasonable basis" exists to
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is
being committed. 94 Therefore, a State Party referral to the Prosecutor
based upon a minimal quantum of evidence, followed by the Prosecutor's
finding that a "reasonable basis" exists to believe that United States nation-
als have committed crimes within the Court's jurisdiction, is sufficient to
commence a formal investigation under the Statute. In short, the statutory
threshold to commence an ICC investigation based on a State Party referral
is quite low.
The Statute also permits the initiation of a formal investigation against
United States nationals even in the absence of a referral by a State Party or
the U.N. Security Council. Pursuant to Article 15, if after analysing the
seriousness of information received from States, intergovernmental or non-
governmental organizations, or other reliable sources, the Prosecutor con-
cludes that there is a "reasonable basis" to believe that a crime has been
committed within the jurisdiction of the Court, she shall request authority
from the Pre-Trial Chamber to proceed with an investigation. 95 The stan-
dard applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber is whether a "reasonable basis"
exists to proceed with the investigation.96 However, a unanimous ruling by
the Court is not required. Instead, a decision to proceed can be granted by
the concurrence of two members of the three-member panel of the Pre-Trial
Chamber.97 In light of the relatively low threshold required for the Court
to authorize an investigation, an ICC investigation of United States military
personnel and government officials would likely be authorized by the
Court.98
93. Unlike the case where the Prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu and
is required to obtain approval from the Pre-Trial Chamber prior to proceeding with an
investigation, if a State Party refers the matter, Court authorization is not required as a
precondition to initiating a formal investigation. Id. arts. 15(3), 18(1). In other words,
in the case of a State Party referral, the Prosecutor rather than the Pre-Trial Chamber has
the final say on whether to authorize an investigation.
94. Id. art. 18(1); see also id. art. 53(1)(a).
95. Id. art. 15(3). In this case, the investigation would focus on whether the inadver-
tent bombing of the hospital, which resulted in the killing of innocent civilians, consti-
tuted a war crime or perhaps even a crime against humanity. Id. arts. 7, 8. Victims can
also "make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence." Id. art. 15(3).
96. Id. art. 15(4).
97. See id. art. 57(2)(a).
98. See id. art. 15 (requiring Prosecutor to obtain authority of Pre-Trial Chamber to
proceed with a prosecutor-initiated investigation); see also id. art. 57(2)(a) (providing
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The next step in the process would be to determine whether either the
State of nationality of the accused or the State where the conduct in ques-
tion occurred has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.99 On this point,
it should be emphasized that even if the United States, the State of national-
ity of the alleged offenders, is not a Party to the Statute nor consents to the
Court's jurisdiction, the ICC may still exercise jurisdiction if the territorial
State is a State Party to the Statute (automatic jurisdiction) or consents to
the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the crimes in the question (accept-
ance of jurisdiction). 0 0 In this case, the territorial State is not a Party to
the Treaty, but has demanded that United States officials and military com-
manders be prosecuted by the ICC. Acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction
by the territorial State is therefore a foregone conclusion.
Next, the Court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Article 19 provides that "[t]he Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdic-
tion in any case brought before it," and "on its own motion, determine the
admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17."10° Assuming that
the territorial State accepts the Court's jurisdiction, and the investigation
involves allegations that war crimes have been committed, an offence
within Article 5, it appears that U.S. military personnel who were sent
abroad would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Ultimately, the critical issue with respect to an ICC investigation and
prosecution of United States military and government personnel turns on
issues of admissibility and complementarity. Article 18(1) triggers the
principle of complementarity. In the case of a referral to the Prosecutor by
a State Party, and the Prosecutor has determined that there is a reasonable
basis to commence an investigation, or the Prosecutor has initiated an
investigation proprio motu pursuant to Articles 13(c) and 15, Article 18(1)
would require the Prosecutor to notify the United States that its nationals
are the target of an ICC investigation.1 0 2 After receipt of such notice, the
United States would have limited recourse to attempt to halt, or even tem-
porarily suspend the ICC investigation. First, pursuant to Article 16, an
ICC investigation could be temporarily suspended if the U.N. Security
that rulings on Article 15 may be made by a concurrence of the members of the Pre-Trial
Chamber, unanimity not required).
99. See id. art. 12.
100. Id. Professor Halberstam points outs the irony in this case. She states that U.S.
military personnel who are sent abroad would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court,
even if the United States does not ratify the Treaty, if the State on whose territory they
acted is either a party to the Statute or consents to the Court's jurisdiction. Paradoxi-
cally, Professor Halberstam states, the Court may not have jurisdiction over perpetrators
of war crimes who are nationals of a State that is a party to the Statute because it per-
mits a State, on becoming a Party, to declare that it does not accept the jurisdiction of
the Court with respect to war crimes alleged to have been committed by its nationals or
on its territory, for a period of seven years. Id. art. 124. However, by contrast, a country
that does not join the treaty but deploys its soldiers abroad to restore international peace
and security could be vulnerable to the Court's jurisdiction over the acts of those
soldiers. Colloquy, Association of American Law Schools Panel on the International Crimi-
nal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV 223, 257-58 (1999) (remarks by Malvina Halberstam).
101. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(1).
102. Id. art. 18(1).
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Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, requested the Court to postpone the ICC investigation.10 3 Article
16 further provides that the investigation could be suspended for a period
of twelve months, but the request could be renewed by the Security Coun-
cil under the same conditions. 104 However, several problems arise through
use of Article 16. First, the Security Council must act under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter.' 0 5 Chapter VII only applies if the Security
Council determines that there is "a threat to the peace, breach of the peace
or act of aggression ...."106 Second, a Security Council resolution would
require an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring
votes of the permanent members. 10 7 Thus, an attempt to suspend the ICC
investigation could be vetoed by a negative vote of one of the permanent
members or by the United States' failure to garner an affirmative vote of
nine members of the Security Council.
A second avenue of recourse afforded the United States would be to
initiate its own investigation of the conduct in question. After initiating an
investigation, pursuant to Article 18(2), the United States could file a
motion with the Pre-Trial Chamber requesting that the Prosecutor defer to
its jurisdiction. '08 To be timely, the United States' motion would have to
file its motion within one month of receipt of the Prosecutor's notice of a
pending ICC investigation. 10 9 However, the Statute does not mandate
deferral. Instead, the Prosecutor is vested with wide discretion whether to
grant the request for State deferral or petition the Pre-Trial Chamber to
authorize the investigation. t 0 Assuming that the Prosecutor granted the
United States' request to defer, the ICC would not be divested of jurisdic-
tion over the matter. Under the Statute, the Prosecutor's deferral to the
United States' investigation could be reviewed by the Prosecutor six
months after the date of deferral, or any time when there has been a signifi-
cant change of circumstances that suggest the United States' "unwilling-
ness or inability to genuinely carry out the investigation." 11 Additionally,
under the Statute the Prosecutor could request that the United States peri-
odically inform her of the progress of its investigation.' 12 Pursuant to Arti-
103. Id. art. 16. Article 16 states:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions.
Id.
104. Id. art. 16.
105. Id.
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
107. Id. art. 27.
108. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(2). However, the State's motion to defer must
be filed within one month of receipt of notification by the Prosecutor that an ICC investi-
gation has been initiated. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. art. 18(3).
112. See id. art. 18(5).
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cle 18(5), the United States would be required to respond to such a request
without undue delay. 113 Finally, a decision to defer to the United States'
jurisdiction would not necessarily stop the ICC Prosecutor from continu-
ing to investigate the matter. Under Article 18(6), the Prosecutor could
seek authority from the Pre-Trial Chamber to pursue necessary investiga-
tive steps for the purpose of preserving evidence when there is a unique
opportunity to obtain important evidence or prevent such evidence from
being lost or destroyed. 114
The ultimate test of the principle of complementarity would arise if,
after the United States concluded its investigation, it decided not to file
criminal charges against the persons concerned. The United States' deci-
sion not to prosecute could be based on its reading of relevant legal author-
ity, which it determines does not support prosecution of persons
concerned for crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. In other words, United
States prosecutors might conclude that the conduct in question, albeit per-
haps negligent, preventable, and even a dereliction of duty by military com-
manders, does not satisfy the elements of the offence needed to prove a war
crime as defined by Article 8 of the Statute.
Alternatively, the decision not to prosecute also could be based on the
proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. For example, United States
prosecutors might find that the quantity or quality of the evidence is insuf-
ficient to convince a unanimous jury of the accused's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.11 5 Additionally, federal prosecutors may decide that, due
to possible mitigating circumstances, the case should be resolved pursuant
to a plea bargain which might include a promise by the government not to
prosecute or permit the accused to enter a guilty plea to reduced charges.
In any event, under this scenario the United States' decision would be
based on a good faith assessment of the relevant law, facts, and evidence,
and not made for the purpose of shielding the accused from criminal
responsibility.
Under the circumstances described above, the ICC would determine
whether the United States' investigation and decision not to prosecute ren-
dered the case inadmissible under Article 17 of the Rome Statute. If so, the
principle of complementarity would require the ICC to defer to the United
States' handling of the matter. If not, the ICC could exercise its jurisdic-
tion over United States military personnel despite a completed investiga-
tion and decision by United States officials not to prosecute. In other
words, if the Court determines the case is admissible, the ICC need not
defer to the United States' proceedings.
Pursuant to Article 19(1), the Court may determine the admissibility
113. See id.
114. See id. art. 18(6).
115. The Rome Statute does not authorize jury trials nor require unanimity to con-
vict. Instead, a criminal conviction under the Statute may be based on a concurrence of
two judges of a three-judge panel of the Trial Chamber. Id. art. 74. It states, "The judges
shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their decision, failing which the decision shall be
taken by a majority of the judges." Id. art. 74(3).
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of a case sua sponte. 116 Additionally, challenges to the admissibility of a
case may be made by an accused, or "[a] State which has jurisdiction over a
case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has
investigated or prosecuted."' 17 A State from which acceptance of jurisdic-
tion is required under Article 12 can also make a challenge.' [8 Finally,
"[tihe Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of
. . .admissibility."' '9 Thus, the United States and the accused could file
separate motions under Article 19 challenging the admissibility of the case
based on the United States' investigation and decision not to prosecute,
requesting deferral of jurisdiction.120 At the same time, the Prosecutor and
the State where the alleged criminal conduct occurred, which accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court, could file a response claiming that the case is
admissible under Article 17.121
Pursuant to Article 17(1), a case may be inadmissible for four reasons.
First, the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State with jurisdic-
tion. 12 2 Second, the State has investigated the case and concluded that
there is no basis to prosecute.1 23 Third, the person has already been tried
for the conduct at issue. 124 Finally, the case is of insufficient gravity to
proceed.' 25 In this situation, only the second (State decision not to prose-
cute), and perhaps the fourth (insufficient gravity) basis for determining
that a case is inadmissible, would be implicated by the United States' deci-
sion not to prosecute. Because the United States' investigation has been
completed and no one has been prosecuted, the reasons for finding a case
inadmissible under Article 17(1)(a) and (c) would not apply.
However, pursuant to Article 17(2), when a case has been investigated
by a State with jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prose-
cute the persons concerned, the Court may find the case admissible if the
investigation and decision resulted from the State's "unwillingness or
inability" "genuinely to prosecute."12 6 A finding of admissibility based on
the United States' inability genuinely to prosecute is not implicated in the
situation described above. Under Article 17(3), inability means that due to
a "total or substantial collapse of its national judicial system, the State is
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
116. Id. art. 19(1).
117. Id. arts. 19(2)(a), (b).
118. Id. art. 19(2).
119. Id. art. 19(3).
120. Id. art. 19(2)(a), (b).
121. Id. arts. 19(2)(c), 19(3).
122. Id. art. 17(1)(a).
123. Id. art. 17(1)(b).
124. Id. art. 17(l)(c).
125. Id. art. 17(l)(d). Under this theory of inadmissibility, the United States could
argue that prosecution before the ICC should be reserved for the most egregious viola-
tions of international criminal law, such as the situations in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. Furthermore, however unfortunate and condemnable, the killing of inno-
cent civilians in the inadvertent hospital bombing does rise to the level of seriousness
necessary to implicate the ICC's jurisdiction.
126. Id. art. 17(1)(b).
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otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings."' 2 7 This provision, it
seems, would cover a situation, such as that in Rwanda, in which the
State's national judicial system was unable to carry out its proceedings due
to political turmoil, armed conflict, and the resultant damage and destruc-
tion to the infrastructure and governmental institutions. Obviously, this
provision is inapplicable in the present hypothetical case.
With respect to whether the United States' investigation and decision
not to prosecute resulted from its unwillingness to genuinely prosecute,
pursuant to Article 17(2), the Court could find the case admissible and not
defer to the United States' proceedings if: (1) the State proceedings were
undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of "shield-
ing" the persons concerned from prosecution before the ICC; 1 28 (2) there
has been an "unjustified delay" in the proceedings which is inconsistent
with an intent to bring the persons concerned to justice; 12 9 or (3) the pro-
ceedings were not conducted "independently or impartially," and were con-
ducted in a manner inconsistent with an intent to bring the persons
concerned to justice. 130
Assuming that the United States conducted its investigation expedi-
tiously and decided not to prosecute in a timely fashion, "unjustified
delay" could not serve as a legal basis to support a finding of "unwilling-
ness" to prosecute. Furthermore, under Article 17(2)(c), whether the
United States made its decision not to prosecute for the purpose of "shield-
ing" the persons concerned would require proof that the investigation and
proceedings were corrupt, a sham, and conducted in bad faith. Moreover,
the Court would have to find that United States officials had the specific
intent to shield the persons accused from criminal responsibility and
thereby undermine the judicial process. In short, the Court would have to
find that United States prosecutors were involved in corruption of jus-
tice. 1 3 1 Thus, Article 17(2)(b) imposes a heavy burden on the Court, the
Prosecutor, and the territorial State to prove the case admissible on these
grounds.' 3 2 It is highly unlikely that the Prosecutor could sustain such a
heavy burden based on the reasons given by the United States for its deci-
sion not to prosecute.
Finally, the Court could rule that the case is admissible if the proceed-
ings were not conducted "independently or impartially," and were con-
ducted in a manner inconsistent with the intent to bring the accused to
justice. 133 A finding of admissibility arguably could be based on these
grounds. The problem lies with language contained in Article 17(2).
When determining whether a State is "unwilling" to prosecute based on
127. Id. art. 17(3).
128. Id. art. 17(2)(a).
129. Id. art. 17(2)(b).
130. Id. art. 17(2)(c).
131. Obstruction of justice is a serious offence under United States law. It is gov-
erned by 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and imposes a penalty of no more than 10 years imprison-
ment, a fine, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).
132. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(b).
133. Id. art. 17(2)(c).
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one or more of the grounds articulated in Article 17(2), the Court must
consider "principles of due process recognized by international law. ' ' 3 4
However, the proper application of "principles of due process recognized
by international law" in determining whether a State is "unwilling" to gen-
uinely prosecute is unclear. More specifically, the use of the term "due
process" within the context of whether the State proceedings were con-
ducted "independently or impartially" is particularly perplexing.
Under the United States Constitution, the Fifth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause guarantees that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." 135 In the American judicial system,
due process is a right afforded the defendant in criminal proceedings and
guarantees that he shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property unless
the proceedings against him comported with fundamental principles of
fairness. 1 36 In contrast, under Article 17(2)(c), if the national proceedings
were not conducted independently and impartially, and as a result the
State decided not to prosecute, the accused would not be prejudiced
thereby. In fact, in such a case, the proceedings would inure to his benefit.
Of course, if the opposite occurred, and the defendant was convicted in a
domestic trial, "principles of due process recognized by international law"
would be relevant to determine whether the defendant's State prosecution
was conducted consistent with due process principles.
Assuming that the drafters of the Statute included this language as an
objective way to measure whether the national proceedings were conducted
fairly with respect to all parties concerned, several issues arise. First, what
do "principles of due process recognized by international law" say about
plea-bargaining and the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion? Sec-
ond, what if a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute is based on a legal
analysis that certain critical evidence is inadmissible at trial because the
evidence was seized in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights,
and without such evidence a criminal conviction cannot be obtained? On
such issues, international principles of due process are not instructive with
respect to whether the national proceedings were conducted "indepen-
dently or impartially." 137
Of course, the United States may be concerned that the ICC could find
that the national proceedings were not conducted "independently or impar-
tially" because the United States' interpretation of relevant legal authority
was inconsistent with "principles of due process recognized by interna-
tional law" (whatever that means). Thus, the ICC might conclude that the
134. Id. art. 17(2).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
136. E.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (conviction obtained
through deliberate deception of the court and jury by introduction of known perjured
testimony violates due process); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (Due Process
Clause imposes an affirmative obligation to disclose to defendant materials in posses-
sion of government that are exculpatory and material to defendant's defence); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (due process violated when defendant's conviction was
based on involuntary confession).
137. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(c).
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United States' decision against prosecution resulted from its "unwilling-
ness" to genuinely prosecute the case. The case is therefore admissible and
deference to the United States' proceedings is not required. Likewise, the
ICC could second-guess the United States and conclude that the reasons
advanced for exercising prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute were
inconsistent with "principles of due process recognized by international
law," and therefore the proceedings were not conducted "independently or
impartially."'138 The ICC could therefore find the case to be admissible
under Articles 17 and 19.
However, in both scenarios, when the decision not to prosecute is
based on questions of law or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the
United States was able and willing genuinely to prosecute, and did conduct
a criminal investigation in good faith. 139 Furthermore, in neither case
could the United States' proceedings properly be characterized as a sham
aimed at shielding the perpetrators from justice. Nonetheless, an analysis
of the relevant Articles of the Statute suggests that the Court could find the
cases admissible and exercise its jurisdiction, rather than defer to the
United States proceedings conducted in good faith.
If the Rome Statute permits such a result, whether the ICC is truly
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions must be seriously re-
examined. If the Court may substitute its judgment any time it disagrees
with the outcome of the State proceedings, the relationship of the ICC with
respect to national criminal jurisdictions is substantially more than to
serve as a complementary court that fill the gap when a State is either
unwilling or unable to prosecute perpetrators of serious international
crimes. Despite declarations in the Preamble and Article 1 of the Rome
Statute that the ICC shall be a complementary court, Articles 17 through
19 merely permit a State to prosecute persons who have allegedly commit-
ted crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The ICC simply defers to
State criminal jurisdictions in the first instance, but reserves the right, and
possesses the authority, to intervene as it sees fit. Plainly speaking, if the
Court disagrees with the outcome in the State proceedings, it has the final
say on the matter. The Court may override the complementarity principle,
and trump the State proceedings if it concludes that they were not con-
ducted "independently or impartially" because such proceedings were
inconsistent with "principles of due process recognized by international
138. United States courts are reluctant to intervene with respect to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. But see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65
(1996) (federal court may review prosecutor's decision to prosecute if based on race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification, in violation of the equal protection component
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181
(1992) (holding a federal court may review a government decision not to file a motion to
reduce a defendant's sentence only if there has been a threshold showing that the Gov-
ernment based its decision on the defendant's race or religion).
139. The term "genuinely" was added to Article 17 to satisfy concerns of many dele-
gations that the Court's decision on questions of admissibility should be based on objec-
tive criteria. These States argued very forcefully for the deletion of any perceived
subjective criteria. "Genuinely" was ultimately adopted because it was believed to reflect
an objective connotation. Holmes, supra note 21, at 49-50.
Cornell International Law Journal
law." 140 Thus, in essence, the Court functions as a super or supreme inter-
national appellate court, passing judgments on the decisions and proceed-
ings of national judicial systems. The jurisdiction of the Court is not truly
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. Rather, it is
peremptory.
The problem, however, is not insurmountable. The principle of com-
plementarity should draw a distinction between sham proceedings con-
ducted for the purpose of protecting persons from criminal responsibility
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and those where the ICC
merely disagrees with the outcome. If the State officials who conducted
the national criminal proceedings had the specific intent to obstruct jus-
tice, as demonstrated by evidence that the proceedings were a sham or
involved an unjustifiable delay suggesting a lack of intent to bring the per-
petrators to justice, the ICC should find the case admissible and exercise
its jurisdiction.1 4 1 Simply stated, the ICC should not defer to sham State
proceedings conducted in bad faith.
However, in the absence of a finding that State officials had the spe-
cific intent to "obstruct justice" by conducting a sham investigation or
criminal prosecution, the principle of complementarity should require the
ICC to grant "substantial deference" to the national proceeding. The ICC is
not a super-international appellate court vested with de novo review
authority over national criminal judgments. Thus, the ICC should not be
permitted to exercise its jurisdiction merely because it disagrees with the
final outcome in the State proceedings.
Additionally, when a decision not to prosecute is based on the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion, absent a finding of intent to corrupt the process
of justice, the ICC should be even less willing to exercise its discretion. On
this point, the ICC should be guided by the position adopted by the United
States Supreme Court. In United States v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court
rejected a selective prosecution claim, holding that respondents failed to
make a threshold showing that the Government declined to prosecute simi-
larly situated suspects based on race.14 2 In reaching its conclusion, the
Armstrong Court posited that a "presumption of regularity supports"
prosecutorial decisions and, "in the absence of clear evidence to the con-
trary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their
official duties."'143 The Court further emphasized that "the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring ... generally
rests entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion."144
140. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2).
141. This principle is captured in Article 17(2)(a), which provides that the ICC may
determine that a case is admissible where the national proceedings were or are being
undertaken or the national decision made for the purpose of shielding the perpetrator
from criminal responsibility. Id. art. 17(2)(a).
142. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
143. Id. at 464 (citing United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1926)).
144. Id. at 464 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
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Prosecutorial decisions to prosecute are afforded judicial deference
based on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and
courts. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that "[sluch factors as
the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the
Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the
Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake."'145 Thus, with
respect to a State decision not to prosecute, the ICC should withhold its
jurisdiction if there is a reasonable basis for the prosecutor's decision. If
the State prosecutor is able to articulate a legitimate reason for exercising
his discretion not to file criminal charges, absent a showing that the State
proceedings were conducted for the purpose of shielding the concerned
persons from criminal responsibility, the ICC should defer jurisdiction.
At the same time, perpetrators of serious international crimes should
not be afforded a windfall when the investigating State's decision not to
prosecute was clearly erroneous. The ICC should not be required to defer
when the State judgment on factual or legal sufficiency was clear error.146
Limiting the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction to cases where the State deci-
sions were "clearly erroneous" would impose a much higher standard of
review than that found in Article 17(2), which permits a finding of admis-
sibility if the Court determines that the national proceedings were not con-
ducted "independently or impartially" because they were inconsistent with
"principles of due process recognized by international law."147 Under the
proposed rule, a determination that the national proceedings were incon-
sistent with rules of international due process, by itself, would be insuffi-
cient to support a ruling of admissibility.
In sum, the ICC should be permitted to exercise its jurisdiction follow-
ing the completion of a State criminal investigation and decision not to
prosecute only if the State proceedings were a sham and conducted for the
purpose of shielding the perpetrator from criminal responsibility, or the
national judgment on findings of fact or questions of law was clearly erro-
neous. Such a standard would afford State judgments reasonable defer-
ence, which is more consistent with the principle of complementarity than
a procedural scheme that permits the ICC to act as a super international
appellate court and conduct a de novo review of State proceedings.
Finally, the insertion of the language in Article 17(2) that a State's
"unwillingness" to prosecute should be measured by "principles of due pro-
cess recognized by international law" should be deleted from the Statute
because it provides the ICC with a legal loophole to overrule national judg-
ments when the Court disagrees with the outcome in the national proceed-
145. Id. at 465 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
146. United States appellate courts generally grant substantial deference to a trial
court's findings of fact and only reverse in the case of clear error. E.g., Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (holding that the appropriate standard of review of Sentenc-
ing Guideline departures is an abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo). While
federal appellate courts generally apply a de novo standard of review on questions of
law, appellate courts are not considered complementary to trial courts.
147. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2).
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ings. Vesting the ICC with such discretion is both inconsistent and
incompatible with the principle of complementarity.
IV. Prosecution Under Article 8 for Alleged War Crimes Committed
by United States Nationals During a United Nations Peace-
Keeping Mission
Having determined that under the Rome Statute the ICC could exercise its
jurisdiction over United States nationals despite a completed United States
investigation that resulted in a decision not to prosecute, the issue becomes
whether under Article 8 American soldiers, military commanders, and gov-
ernment officials may be convicted of war crimes for the unintentional kill-
ing of innocent civilians committed during a United Nations peace-keeping
operation. 148 As the following analysis will demonstrate, several subsec-
tions of Article 8 arguably could support a criminal conviction.
A. The So-Called "Threshold Clause"
Article 8(1) states that the Court "shall have jurisdiction in respect of war
crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part
of a large-scale commission of such crimes." 149 At first glance, Article 8(1)
appears to establish a jurisdictional threshold which limits the ICC's juris-
diction to war crimes committed as part of a "plan or policy" or when com-
mitted on a "large-scale." 1 5 0 However, a closer examination of the
statutory language reveals that the "in particular when" language of Article
8(1) merely suggests a guideline for the Court's exercise of jurisdiction
over war crimes. 151
Under Article 8(1), the Court's jurisdiction is implicated "in particular
when," not "only when," the condemned acts are committed as part of a
plan or policy or committed on a large-scale. 15 2 Article 8(1) therefore does
not impose a requirement that war crimes be committed in a systematic
manner or on a large-scale. Consequently, it would be no defence to
charges brought under Article 8 that the killing of innocent civilians by
American soldiers was not part of a governmental plan or policy or that the
incident occurred on a single occasion. 153 The so-called "threshold
148. Under Article 124, the so-called "opt-out" provision, a State Party may declare,
for a period of seven years after the entry into force of the Statute, that it does not accept
the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to the category of crimes referred to in Article 8
with respect to war crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory. Id. art. 124.
Thus, the United States could agree to support the International Criminal Court, but
declare that it does not accept the Court's jurisdiction over war crimes allegedly commit-
ted by its nationals.
149. Id. art. 8(1).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. At the Rome Conference, delegates were divided over the necessity of a threshold
clause. Those in favor of such a clause argued that the international community should
be concerned only with systematic or large-scale occurrences of war crimes. These dele-
gates supported inclusion of a threshold clause that provided that the Court shall have
jurisdiction over war crimes "only when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part
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clause" is therefore more aptly characterized as a "non-threshold
threshold."1 54
The failure to require that war crimes be committed as part of a plan
or policy or committed on a large-scale is inconsistent with the definition
of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute. Crimes against
humanity, as defined by Article 7, require proof that the prohibited con-
duct was committed "as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population." 155 Article 7(2)(a) further provides that, for
purposes of Article 7(1), an "laittack directed against any civilian popula-
tion" means a course of conduct involving "the multiple commission of
acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack."156 Thus, to convict a person for the commission of crimes against
humanity, the ICC Prosecutor must prove that the crimes were committed
on a large-scale, and pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organiza-
tional policy. It is unclear why the definition of war crimes under Article 8
does not contain a similar large-scale and organizational policy
requirement. 157
B. Norms Applicable to "International Armed Conflicts"
To be convicted of "war crimes" under Article 8, the prohibited conduct
must have occurred during the commission of either an international or
internal "armed conflict."' 5 8 Furthermore, in the case of an "international
armed conflict," Article 8(2) distinguishes between two different types of
war crimes, "grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and "other
serious violations of the law and customs applicable in armed conflict." 15 9
of large-scale commission of such crimes." Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson,
Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra
note 2, at 108. A majority of delegations opposed any threshold provision. The lan-
guage "in particular when committed" was considered an acceptable compromise over
the requirement that the ICC exercise jurisdiction over war crimes "only when commit-
ted" in a systematic manner or on a large scale. Id.
154. Von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 153, at 124.
155. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
156. Id. art. 7(2)(a).
157. It should further be noted that Article 5(1) states that "[tihe jurisdiction of the
Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international com-
munity as a whole." Id. art. 5(1).
158. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court:
An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L. J. 381, 434 (2000) ("[Iln spite of some ambiguity in
article 8(2)(b), it appears that war crimes cannot be committed within the meaning of
the Rome Statute unless an armed conflict exists.").
159. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2). The 1949 Geneva Conventions include:
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of
War]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Relative
to Civilians]; Geneva Convention Relative to Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
Relative to Wounded and Sick]; Geneva Convention Relative to Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
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Moreover, under principles of customary international law, it is well settled
that "grave breaches" can occur only when committed during an "interna-
tional" armed conflict. 160 With respect to "[o]ther serious violations of the
laws and customs" of armed conflict, Article 8(2)(b) explicitly requires
that such violations occur in "international armed conflict."' 16 l
Article 8(2)(a) incorporates by reference the "grave breaches" provi-
sions of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, prohibiting any of the follow-
ing acts against persons or property protected under the relevant
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
(i) Wilful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property... ;
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile Power;
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
(viii) Taking of hostages.1 62
[hereinafter Geneva Convention Relative to Wounded and Sick at Sea]. It should be
emphasized that the "grave breaches" provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions estab-
lish universal mandatory jurisdiction only with respect to those breaches of the Conven-
tions committed in international armed conflicts. For example, Article 146 of the
Geneva Conventions Relative to Civilians provides: "Each High Contracting Party shall
be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless
of their nationality, before its own courts." Geneva Convention Relative to Civilians,
supra, art. 146. Each of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have similar provisions. See
Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War, supra, art. 129; Geneva Convention
Relative to Wounded and Sick, supra, art. 49; Geneva Convention Relative to Wounded
and Sick at Sea, supra, art. 50.
160. In The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment
(Trial Chamber, Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., May 7, 1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908
(1997), the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held that Article 2 of the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which estab-
lishes jurisdiction over "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, only
applies to offences committed within the context of international armed conflicts. Id.
While the Yugoslavia Tribunal recognized a growing trend towards extending the "grave
breaches" system to internal armed conflicts, the Court concluded that opinio juris of
States does not yet support that view. Id.
161. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b).
162. Id. art. 8(2)(a). Each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain a grave
breaches provision. For example, Article 147 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilians provides that "grave breaches" involve any of the following acts if
committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention:
IWlilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experi-
ments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
unlawful deportation or transfer of unlawful confinement of a protected person,
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or
wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of a fair and regular trial
prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruc-
tion and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and car-
ried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Geneva Convention Relative to Civilians, supra note 159, art. 147.
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C. "Other Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in
International Armed Conflict"
Under Article 8(2)(b), war crimes also include "[o]ther serious violations
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict."16 3
Article 8(2)(b) enumerates twenty-six different types of conduct prohibited
under customary or conventional international law. These prohibited acts
fall under three general categories: (1) acts directed at protected per-
sons,1 6 4 (2) acts directed at protected property,16 5 and (3) limitations
imposed on the methods and means of warfare. For example, with respect
to protected persons, Article 8(2)(b) makes it a war crime to (i) intention-
ally attack civilian populations; 166 (ii) intentionally attack against humani-
tarian assistance personnel or United Nations peacekeepers;1 6 7 (iii)
intentionally launch an attack knowing that the attack will cause clearly
excessive incidental loss of life or injury to civilians in relation to the over-
all military advantage anticipated;' 6 3 (iv) kill or wound combatants who
have laid down arms or surrendered;' 6 9 (v) transfer parts of the Occupying
Power's own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the popu-
lations of the occupied territory within or outside this territory;170 (vi) per-
form medical or scientific experiments not justified by medical
treatment; 17 (vii) treacherously kill or wound individuals part of a hostile
nation or army;' 72 (viii) commit outrages of humiliation and degrada-
tion; 173 (ix) commit any form of sexual violence including rape, sexual
slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, or other
forms of sexual violence "constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Con-
ventions;"' 74 and (x) enlist children less than the age of 15 years old into
the national armed forces utilizing their participation in hostilities. 175
163. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b).
164. As a general rule, "protected persons" under the 1949 Geneva Conventions
include persons not taking direct part in the hostilities, such as prisoners of war, the
wounded and sick, and innocent civilians. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to
Prisoners of War, supra note 159, art. 4; Geneva Convention Relative to Civilians, supra
note 159, art. 4; Geneva Convention Relative to Wounded and Sick, supra note 159, art.
49; Geneva Convention Relative to Wounded and Sick at Sea, supra note 159, art. 50.
165. As a general rule, "protected property" under the 1949 Geneva Conventions
includes property which does not have a military objective, and property against which
the launching of an attack will knowingly cause incidental destruction which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the overall military objective. See generally Geneva Con-
vention Relative to Civilians, supra note 159, art. 144; Geneva Convention Relative to
Wounded and Sick, supra note 159, art. 146; Geneva Convention Relative to Wounded
and Sick at Sea, supra note 159, art. 50.
166. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(i).
167. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iii).
168. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
169. Id.
170. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(viii).
171. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(x).
172. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xi).
173. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxi).
174. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).
175. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi).
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Article 8(2)(b) also makes it a war crime to direct attacks against cer-
tain protected property, including (i) "fi]ntentionally directing attacks
against civilian objects . . .which are not military objectives;" 176 (ii)
"[i]ntentionally directing attacks against personnel installations, material,
units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian or peace-keeping mission
"177 (iii) "[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated
to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monu-
ments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected
; 178 (iv) "[i]ntentionally launching an attack knowing that such attack
will cause incidental damage to civilian objects which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated;"' 79 (v) "[a]ttacking or bombarding ... towns, villages, dwell-
ings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objec-
tives;"'180 (vii) "[d]estroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such
destruction or seizure be demanded by the necessities of war;"' 8 1 (viii)
"[p]illaging a town or place, even when taken by assault";t 8 2 and (ix)
"[ilntentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units
and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions in conformity with international law.'183
Finally, under Article 8(2)(b) certain means and methods of con-
ducting warfare are condemned as war crimes, including, (i) "[e]mploying
poison or poisoned weapons;"' 18 4 (ii) "[elmploying asphyxiating, poison-
ous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices; ' 18 5 (iii)
"[eimploying bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body
; " 186 and (iv) "[i]ntentionally using starvation of civilians as a method
of warfare."' 8 7 Paragraph (xx) contains a general clause allowing for an
additional list of prohibited weapons. This paragraph states:
Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which
are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or
which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of
armed conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are
included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with
the relevant provisions set forth in Articles 121 and 123.188
176. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ii).
177. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iii).
178. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ix).
179. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
180. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(v).
181. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xiii).
182. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xvi).
183. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxiv).
184. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xvii).
185. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xviii).
186. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xix).
187. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
188. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xx); see also Von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 153, at 113-16,
for a discussion of the controversy surrounding whether the Statute should contain a
general clause on prohibited weapons or a closed list of such weapons.
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D. Norms Applicable to "Internal Armed Conflicts"
Article 8(2)(c) and (e) proscribe conduct that constitutes a war crime when
committed during an "internal conflict."'18 9 Subsections (d) and (f) of Arti-
cle 8 provide both a negative and positive definition of what constitutes an
"armed conflict not of an international character."'190 Section (d) sets
forth the negative definition and reads: "Paragraph 2(c) applies to armed
conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situa-
tions of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and spo-
radic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature." 19 1
In effect, subsection (d) limits the scope of application of subsection
(c) by excluding from it certain situations that are not within the concept
of internal armed conflict, and therefore is described as a negative
definition.
Section (f) of the statute also contains a "positive" definition that
describes what a non-international armed conflict entails. Article 8(f) pro-
vides: "It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a
State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups."'1 9 2
This additional sentence was included in subsection (f) as a compro-
mise to those States that sought the inclusion of the whole of Article 1(1) of
Additional Protocol II, which requires that the dissident armed forces or
other organized armed groups "exercise such control over a part of the
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations."' 9 3 It also requires that such forces or groups act "under
responsible command" and are able to implement the obligations under
Protocol 1I.
194
189. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(c). It states:
In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious viola-
tions of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active
part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or
any other cause:
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(iii) Taking of hostages;
The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial
guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.
Id.
190. Id. arts. 8(2)(d), 8(2)().
191. Id. art. 8(2)(d).
192. Id. art. 8(2)().
193. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, art. 1(1) [hereinafter Protocol II]; see also Von Hebel & Robin-
son, supra note 153, at 121.
194. Protocol II, supra note 193, art. 1(1).
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Article 8(2)(c) basically restates Common Article 3 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, criminalizing any of the following acts committed
against persons taking no active part in the hostilities:
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(iii) Taking of hostages;
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable. 19 5
Article 8(2)(e) enumerates "[oither serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international charac-
ter." 9 6 These norms stem from a variety of sources, such as the Hague
Conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocol II.
The list in subsection (e) is very similar to the prohibited acts enumerated
in subsection (b), reflecting the view that these norms equally apply to
internal armed conflicts. 19 7
E. Application of Article 8 to Loss of Life and Property During a U.N.
Peace-Keeping Operation
If the United States participated in a United Nations peace-keeping mission
and a U.S. launched missile inadvertently missed its target, causing loss of
civilian life, the matter could arguably be prosecuted as a war crime under
Article 8 of the Rome Statute. The use of military force by the United
States directed against a foreign State would constitute an "international
armed conflict" within the meaning of Article 8(2) even if sanctioned by
the U.N. and intended to deter the aggrieved State from committing terror-
ist attacks against a dissident minority inside its territory.198 Conse-
quently, any prosecution of American soldiers, military commanders, and
government officials would be limited to violations of Articles 8(2)(a) and
(b), which punish the commission of "grave breaches" and "other serious
violations of the law and customs applicable in" an "international armed
conflict."19 9 More specifically, with respect to the "grave breaches" provi-
sion, a war crimes prosecution arguably could be based on a violation of
Article 8(2)(a)(iv), which proscribes the "[elxtensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried
out unlawfully and wantonly." 2 ° °
195. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(c).
196. Id. art. 8(2)(e).
197. Von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 153, at 119.
198. Under Common Article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, an interna-
tional armed conflict may arise between two or more High Contracting Parties, "even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them." E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to
Prisoners of War, supra note 159, art. 2.
199. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a), (b).
200. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(iv). Neither subsections (i) or (iii) are applicable because each
requires that the prohibited conduct was committed "wilfully." In the hypothetical case
Vol. 35
2001-2002 International Criminal Court
A conviction under Article 8(2)(a)(iv) would require proof of three ele-
ments: (1) the bombing resulted in the "extensive destruction ... of prop-
erty;" (2) the destruction of such property was "not justified by military
necessity;" and (3) the bombing was carried out "unlawfully and wan-
tonly. ' 20 1 Under the facts of the hypothetical case, the first two elements
are easily satisfied. First, the accidental bombing of a hospital and apart-
ment complex would constitute the "extensive destruction . . . of prop-
erty." 20 2 Second, the destruction of the civilian property did not serve any
military purpose and thus was "not justified by military necessity. '20 3
Therefore, successful prosecution under Article 8(2)(a)(iv) would ulti-
mately turn on whether the U.S. military attack was carried out "unlaw-
fully and wantonly. ' 20 4 The aggrieved State would argue that the military
strike was conducted wantonly because the United States acted with reck-
less indifference to whether civilian property would be destroyed.20 5 How-
ever, Article 8(2)(a)(iv) requires that the prohibited conduct was
committed both wantonly and unlawfully. 20 6 Thus, the ICC Prosecutor
would have to prove that the military attack also was unlawful" - lacking
legal authority.
20 7
The United States would argue that the use of military force within the
territory of the aggrieved State constituted the lawful use of force under the
U.N. Security Council's Chapter VII powers. Pursuant to Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is delegated the responsibility of
maintaining and restoring international peace and security. 20 8 Specifi-
cally, Article 42 provides that if economic measures authorized under Arti-
cle 41 would be inadequate or have proven inadequate, the Security
Council "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be neces-
sary to maintain or restore international peace and security."20 9 The
United States would maintain that the use of military force was authorized
by the Security Council, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of Article 42.
Because the military strike was intended to deter violent attacks by the
aggrieved State against a dissident minority in its territory, and thereby
restore international peace and security, the use of force was lawful under
Article 42. Thus, the use of military force was not unlawful under Article
8(2)(a)(iv). A conviction under Article 8(2)(a)(iv) therefore could not be
sustained.
at issue, the killing and causing of great suffering or serious bodily injury to innocent
civilians was, at most, the result of negligent, not wilful conduct. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(i), (iii).
201. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(iv).
202. id.
203. Id.
204, Id.
205, "Wanton" is defined as "[rleckless, heedless, malicious; characterized by
extreme recklessness, foolhardiness; recklessly disregardful of the rights or safety of
others or of consequences." Bi.ACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1582 (6th ed. 1990).
206. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a)(iv).
207. Id.
208. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
209. Id. art. 42.
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However, under Article 8(2)(b), which proscribes "[o]ther serious vio-
lations of the laws and customs" applicable in international armed conflict,
several provisions could apply. 2 10 First, it could be argued that the United
States violated subsection (iv) which punishes "[ilntentionally launching
an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of
life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects .. .which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated." 2 1 1 A conviction under subsection (iv) would
require proof that the United States intentionally launched a military
attack with knowledge that the incidental loss of civilian life or damage to
civilian property was clearly excessive in relation to the military objective
sought. 21 2 In the hypothetical case, there is no question that the United
States intended to launch the attack. However, it is unclear whether U.S.
military officials had the requisite knowledge that incidental loss of civil-
ian life or damage to civilian property would result, which would be
"clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated." 2
13
The critical issue is whether the mens rea knowledge requirement of
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) could be proven. Article 30(3) of the Rome Statute
defines "knowledge" to mean an "awareness that a circumstance exists or a
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. ' '2 t4 If Article
8(2)(b)(iv) requires subjective or actual knowledge, the ICC Prosecutor
would have to prove that American soldiers and military commanders had
actual knowledge that the military strike would cause incidental loss of life
or injury to civilians or damage to civilian property, or were practically
certain that the conduct would cause that result.21 5 Also, the ICC Prosecu-
tor would have to prove that the defendants had actual knowledge that
such collateral loss of life or damage to civilian property was clearly exces-
sive to the direct overall military advantage anticipated. As a practical mat-
ter, an actual or subjective knowledge standard would impose a heavy
burden of proof on the ICC Prosecutor.
On the other hand, if the knowledge requirement of subsection (iv)
was measured by an objective standard, the ICC Prosecutor could sustain a
conviction on proof that the American soldiers and military commanders
acted negligently. A person acts negligently if he is unaware of a substan-
210. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b).
211. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
212. Article 30(1) states that "[ulnless otherwise provided, a person shall be crimi-
nally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge." Id. art.
30(1). Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is consistent with Article 30(1), requiring that the military
launch was carried out intentionally with knowledge that the attack would cause collat-
eral civilian loss of life and property damage excessive to the overall military objective.
Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
213. Id.
214. Id. art. 30(3).
215. A person acts "knowingly" with respect to a result if it is not his conscious
object, yet he is practically certain that the conduct will cause that result. PAUL H. ROBIN-
SON, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.1 (1997).
Vol. 35
2001-2002 International Criminal Court
tial risk, but should have perceived it.2 16 Thus, U.S. soldiers could be con-
victed of war crimes under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) if they "should have known"
that the military attack would cause collateral loss of civilian life and dam-
age to civilian property, and "should have known" that this would be
"clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated. ' 2 17 Thus, under an objective standard of knowl-
edge, even if the defendants lacked actual knowledge of the collateral con-
sequences of their conduct, they could be found guilty if they should have
known of the risk.2 18 Of course, the objective standard represents a much
lower level of culpability than the subjective knowledge standard, making it
much easier to obtain a criminal conviction. 2 19
The hypothetical U.S. military strike also could violate Article
8(2)(b)(v), which prohibits "[a]ttacking or bombarding, by whatever
means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and
which are not military objectives."'220 The actus reus of the offence can be
easily satisfied because the American soldiers bombed a hospital and
apartment complex which were "undefended and ... not military objec-
tives."'221 Because the statute is silent regarding the relevant mens rea
required to support a conviction, Article 30(1) would require that the mate-
rial elements of the offence were committed with intent and knowledge. 22 2
"Intent" is defined under Article 30(2)(b), when "[i]n relation to a con-
sequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it
will occur in the ordinary course of events." 223 Because the bombing of the
hospital and apartment complex was accidental, U.S. soldiers did not
mean to cause that consequence. "Knowledge" is defined under Article
30(3) as being "aware" that collateral damage would occur "in the ordinary
course of events."'2 24 Thus, U.S. soldiers could be convicted for war crimes
under Article 8(2)(b)(v) upon proof that they were "aware" that the mili-
tary strike likely would cause the resultant collateral damage to civilian
property. Furthermore, because Article 30(3) focuses on the defendant's
awareness of the ordinary consequences of his actions, the statute appears
to require proof of a subjective standard of knowledge, rather than an
216. Id. It is generally agreed that negligence represents a lower level of culpability
than recklessness, in that the negligent actor fails to recognize, rather than consciously
disregards, the risk. Id.
217. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
218. In either case, gathering evidence to satisfy the knowledge element of the offence
would likely generate highly contentious litigation over whether the United States
should be required to turn over to the ICC Prosecutor sensitive military files and docu-
ments that arguably could shed light on the defendants' knowledge of the collateral
consequences of launching a military attack. See id. art. 15(2).
219. The ordinary negligence standard of "should have known" is sufficient to sus-
tain a conviction of military commanders under the doctrine of command responsibil-
ity. See discussion infra at Part V.
220. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(v).
221. Id.
222. Id. art. 30(1).
223. Id. art. 30(2)(b).
224. Id. art. 30(3).
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objective standard of "should have known." Thus, a conviction for a viola-
tion of Article 8(2)(b)(v) would require proof of actual knowledge that the
collateral damage would "occur in the ordinary course of events."22 5
V. Criminal Responsibility for Military Commanders and
Government Officials Under the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility
The criminal responsibility of military commanders and other superiors
for the commission of war crimes is significantly expanded by Article 28,
which codifies the doctrine of command responsibility. Article 28 dramat-
ically reduces the burden of proof, providing that a military commander or
government superior can be convicted of war crimes and other crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC based on proof of ordinary negligence -
a showing that he "should have known" that the forces under his command
were committing or about to commit such offences, and failed to take rea-
sonable measures to prevent their commission.
Article 28(a) provides:
A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control,
or effective authority and control ... as a result of his or her failure to exer-
cise control properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were com-
mitting or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution. 2 26
Pursuant to Article 28(a), a military commander faces conviction for
war crimes if he (1) assumed a position of "effective command and control,
or effective authority and control" over subordinates; (2) knew or "should
have known" that the forces were committing or about to commit war
crimes; and (3) failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his power to prevent their commission. 2 27 Furthermore, criminal responsi-
bility is not limited to the commander with direct supervisory responsibil-
ity over subordinates, but extends up the chain of command to hold
criminally liable any person with "effective command and control, or effec-
tive authority and control," who "should have known" that subordinates
were committing or about to commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC. 228 Thus, Pentagon officials could be indicted for war crimes and
prosecuted before the ICC based on a simple negligence standard.
225. Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(v), 30(2)(b).
226. Id. art. 28(a) (emphasis added).
227. Id.
228. Id. arts. 28(a), (a)(i).
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The doctrine of command responsibility further extends to persons
who assume a de facto position of command, including government offi-
cials and other civilians. Article 28(b) states:
With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in par-
agraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effec-
tive authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about
to commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective respon-
sibility and control of the superior; and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution. 2
29
Thus, even in the absence of a formal superior-subordinate relation-
ship, a person may be held criminally responsible for war crimes if (1) the
crimes were committed by subordinates within his "effective authority and
control;" (2) he either knew or consciously disregarded information that
indicated that subordinates were committing or about to commit such
crimes; (3) the crimes concerned activities within his "effective responsibil-
ity and control;" and (4) he failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the commission of such crimes. 230
To determine whether a government official or some other civilian
may be held criminally responsible for war crimes, the critical issue is
whether the accused exercised "effective authority and control" over the
subordinates who actually engaged in the proscribed acts. Unfortunately,
Article 28 fails to define "effective authority and control." The statute is
further silent on the degree of "authority and control" that the de facto
superior must exercise over the subordinates.
The issue, however, has arisen in several cases before the Ad Hoc Inter-
national Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 23 1 and Rwanda. 232 The
229. Id. art. 28(b) (emphasis added).
230. Id.
231. Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993). Article 7(3) provides:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.
Id. art. 7(3); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) (imposing an affirmative duty on military
commanders who are aware that subordinates under their command and other persons
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Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals have liberally construed the requirement
finding that the de facto superior exercised "effective authority and con-
trol" over subordinates. In The Prosecutor v. Delalic, the Trial Chamber pos-
ited that the doctrine of command responsibility "extends beyond the
responsibility of military commanders to also encompass political leaders
and other civilian superiors in positions of authority. ' 233 In order for the
principle of superior responsibility to apply, "[i]t is necessary that the
superior have effective control over the persons committing the underlying
violations of international humanitarian law, in the sense of having the
material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these
offences. ' '234 Thus, the Delalic Court equated "effective control" over sub-
ordinates with the ability of the de facto superior to prevent and punish the
condemned conduct. However, the Court suggested that possessing the
ability to prevent an offence, regardless of whether the defendant possessed
any authority to do so, is a sufficient basis for the imposition of command
responsibility.2 3 5
In The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, the Trial Chamber reaffirmed
the principle that superior responsibility is not limited to military com-
manders but may apply to civilian authorities as well.23 6 The Court
retreated, however, from the view espoused in Delalic that having the abil-
ity to prevent and punish criminal conduct is a prerequisite for command
responsibility to attach. Although the power to sanction is a necessary
corollary of the power to issue orders within the military hierarchy, the
Trial Chamber in Aleksovski posited that it does not apply to civilian
authorities. The de facto superior's ability to impose sanctions therefore is
not essential. 23 7 Instead, the Court focused on the ability to prevent the
criminal conduct, positing that the possibility of transmitting reports to the
appropriate authorities might suffice, if in light of the defendant's position,
"the likelihood that those reports will trigger an investigation or initiate
disciplinary or even criminal measures is extant."238 Thus, the failure of a
government official to submit a report disclosing the commission of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC may be sufficient to support a conviction
for war crimes under the doctrine of command responsibility.
under their control to take all necessary and reasonable steps to prevent and suppress
violations of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)
(holding that the law of war imposes a duty on a military commander to prevent acts in
violation of laws of war).
232. Security Council Resolution Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/
955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
233. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 356, Trial Chamber,
Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. (1998).
234. Id. para. 378.
235. See id. paras. 342, 348.
236. Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, para. 75, Trial
Chamber, Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. (1999).
237. Id. para. 78.
238. Id.
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Finally, in The Prosecutor v. Musema, the Rwandan Trial Chamber
expanded the scope of criminal responsibility for de facto superiors even
further. The Court opined that "influential power, which is not power of
formal command, [is] sufficient basis for charging one with superior
responsibility. '23 9 In other words, merely possessing the ability to influ-
ence others in preventing proscribed criminal activity may be sufficient to
establish that the defendant exercised "effective authority and control" over
subordinates.
In support of this startling proposition, the Musema Court cited the
Herman Roechling judgment. 240 In that case, civilian industrial leaders
were found guilty of war crimes for failing to take action against abuses
committed by members of the Gestapo against forced laborers, based on de
facto influence, which would have allowed defendants to arrange with the
factory police for better treatment of the workers. 24 1 Musema therefore
establishes a remarkably low threshold for subjecting government officials
and other civilians to criminal liability under the doctrine of command
responsibility. Under Musema, merely possessing the ability to influence
others to prevent criminal activity, and then failing to do so, is sufficient
for criminal responsibility to attach for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC.
The implications of Musema are mind-boggling. Under the Trial
Chamber's ruling, it is conceivable that a high-ranking government official
could be convicted of war crimes under the doctrine of command responsi-
bility based on his personal relationship with a military commander, who
had actual command authority, because the government official failed to
use his ability to influence the commander to prevent the proscribed crimi-
nal conduct. Furthermore, under the Rome Statute, criminal liability
could attach despite the absence of any formal authority or responsibility
over the subordinates.
In short, the sweep of criminal responsibility under Article 28(b) blurs
any meaningful distinction between a legal duty and moral obligation. The
civilian who fails to exercise his ability to influence persons in power to
prevent criminal activity may lack moral courage, but surely he should not
be convicted of war crimes or other serious humanitarian offences within
the jurisdiction of the ICC.
VI. Conclusion
The United States has voiced its concerns of the International Criminal
Court through its outcome-based argument in which the ICC could subject
U.S. military personnel to prosecution for inadvertent casualties and prop-
239. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 139, Int'l Crim. Trib.
Rwanda Trial Chamber 1, Jan. 27 (2000).
240. The Government Commissioner of the General Tribunal of the Military Govern-
ment for the French Zone of Occupation in Germany v. Herman Roechling and Others,
Law Reports, Vol. XIV, Appendix B, p. 1075, para. 1092 (cited in Muserma, No. ICTR-96-
13-T, para. 142).
241. Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 142.
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erty damage during a military operation. The United States has reason to
fear this outcome because (1) the Court's jurisdiction is not complemen-
tary to national prosecutions, (2) the Statute's mens rea requirements for
war crimes under Article 8 are often unclear and diminutive, and (3) the
Statute's doctrine of command responsibility extends war crime liability to
upper-level military and civilian commanders based on findings of simple
negligence.
First, the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction violates the text and spirit of
the preamble and Article 1, which declare that the ICC "shall be comple-
mentary to national criminal jurisdictions."24 2 The ICC's jurisdiction is
not complementary, as the statute does not mandate the ICC prosecutor to
defer to national prosecutions conducted in good faith. Rather, the ICC's
exercise of jurisdiction is ultimately based on the court's ability to second-
guess national prosecutions by faulting the independence and impartiality
of national prosecutions, predicated on the vague notion of "principles of
due process recognized by international law." The Court's exercise of
jurisdiction is therefore outcome-based - the Court simply defers to State
criminal jurisdictions in the first instance, but reserves the right, and pos-
sesses the authority, to intervene as it sees fit.
To be truly complementary, the ICC should exercise its jurisdiction
only when the State criminal proceedings were a sham intended to shield
the alleged offenders from prosecution, or when the State's decision not to
prosecute was based on a clearly erroneous application of the law. In the
absence of bad faith or a clearly erroneous decision, the ICC should, at the
very least, afford substantial deference to a State's decision not to
prosecute.
Second, the mens rea requirements for proving a war crime under Arti-
cle 8 are often unclear. Under Article 8(2)(b)(v), for example, the Statute
does not specify whether the element of knowledge constitutes an objective
or subjective standard. The less stringent standard of objective knowledge
could convict soldiers of war crimes under a theory of simple negligence.
The United States should not allow its soldiers to be tried or convicted for
serious humanitarian violations based on prosecutions that require such a
paltry standard of mens rea.
Third, the Rome Statute expands traditional notions of command
responsibility by allowing the Court to try and convict military com-
manders or government superiors for serious breaches of humanitarian
law based on proof of ordinary negligence. Article 28 extends criminal
responsibility to any person with effective or de facto control over subordi-
nates and even those with the mere ability to influence or prevent others
from engaging in criminal activity. As a result, Article 28 blurs any mean-
ingful distinction between legal and moral duty, and subjects those with
little or no direct or formal authority over subordinates to prosecution for
violations of serious humanitarian offenses.
242. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 10; accord id. art. 1
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The Rome Statute creates a super-international appellate court with
unchecked de novo review over national jurisdictions. In its current form,
the Statute threatens national sovereignty, and, without additional jurisdic-
tional guarantees that defer to good-faith national prosecutions and doctri-
nal guarantees that protect soldiers and their civilian and military
commanders from serious humanitarian violations based on simple negli-
gence, the Statute should not be ratified by the United States.

